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INTESTATE SUCCESSION — THE RIGHT TO ELECT DOWER 
— SECTIONS 21, 23 and 32, DEVOLUTION OF ESTATES ACT.
The law of intestate sueession is of such great practical importance 
that it should be as clear and unambiguous as possible. Unfortunately 
this cannot be said of the provisions o f  the New Brunswick Devolution 
of Estates Act1 dealing with the rights of a widow whose husband dies 
intestate. Those provisions are set out in sections 21, 23 and 32 of the 
Act. Section 21 provides for the succession where the husband leaves a 
widow and one or more children; if there is only one child, the widow 
receives one-half of the estate, and if there is more than one child she 
receives one-third of the estate. Under section 23, when an intestate 
leaves a widow and no children, she is entitled to his whole estate up to 
$20,000, and if it exceeds that amount, then to $20,000 and one-half of 
the residue. So far the law is clear, but difficulty arises in interpreting 
section 32 of the Act, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:
32 ............and no widow shall be entitle o dow er in the land o f her deceased
h u sban d  dying intestate, unless she su * i l  elect within six m onths from  the 
date  o f his death not to take the benefits to which she w ould be entitled  
un der section 23 of this Act.
The law is clear where an intestate leaves a widow and no issue. 
Under section 32 the widow has the choice of taking either the benefits 
of section 23 or dower. However, the settlement of the estate of an in­
testate leaving a widow and issue is open to several interpretations.
The first possibility is that the widow of an intestate dying with 
issue no longer nas any right to dower in the deceased’s real property, but 
is only entitled to the benefits under section 21. This means, in other 
words, that dower in the land of an intestate is abolished absolutely 
except when he has left no issue and his widow elects not to take her 
benefits under section 23. While a literal reading of section 32 would 
give this result, several objections may be raised.
Firstly, the widow of an intestate with no issue, by having a right to 
take dower, would be in a preferred position to that of a widow with 
children. There seems no reasonable ground for this distinction, which 
could be inequitable to the latter. As is well known, dower attaches to 
all real property in which a man had a legal estate while married, even 
if he has conveyed it to another (unless the wife was a party to the con­
veyance). During his married life a man might well have owned real pro­
perty of greater value than his combined real and personal property at 
the time of his death. In this case dower might well be of greater value 
than the benefit the widow would receive under section 21 — 
particularly if she had more than one child, when she would receive only 
one-third of the intestate’s real and personal property. The effect is that 
legislation intended to benefit a widow would in fact be to her detri­
ment.
<1.» R .S .N .B . 1952. c. 62. The Act w as first passed  in 1926 and these three sections are v ir t­
ually  unchanged. Only the provisions for in terest in section 23(2* and <3» are  new.
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It follows from the last objection that the suggested interpretation 
would also have unexpected effects on the rights of a purchaser who 
bought land from a seller without obtaining a release from dower. If the 
seller died intestate leaving a widow and issue, the land in the purchas­
er’s hands would not be subject to dower. Yet if the seller died leaving 
a widow and no children, tlie land would be subjcct to dower if the 
widow so elected. It seems inconceivable that the legislature ever con­
templated so strange a result.
Another possible interpretation of section 32 is that dower in the 
estate of an intestate is only abolished when an intestate dies leaving a 
widow and no issue and she fails to clect to take dower. The widow of 
an intestate with issue would then receive both dower and  the benefits 
of section 21, whereas if the intestate left no issue, the widow would 
only be entitled to dower or the benefits under scction 23.
A similar result can be arrived at in another way. It might possibly 
be argued that the widow of an intestate with issue could elect not to 
take any of the benefits under scction 23 (since she could not possiblv 
rcccive such benefits anyway), and thereby be entitled to dower as well 
as the benefits under section 21. Both this inteqiretation and the prev­
ious one are subjcct to the objection that there seems no logical ground 
on which they can be justified.
Up to now, it has been assumed that the words “ no widow shall be 
entitled to dower in the land of her deceased husband, dying intestate,” 
in section 32 apply to all lands that have at any time been owned by the 
husband during his married life. It may, however, be argued that those 
words apply only to land owned by the husband at his death, not lands 
that have been conveyed to others. However, if that interpretation is 
adopted, it simply means that the right of election in section 32 is a 
meaningless procedure, because there could never be a case where dower 
would be more valuable than the benefits under section 23 plus dower 
in land conveyed to others. It is, therefore, submitted that this inter­
pretation is incorrect.
The truth of the mattei appears to be that the legislature intended 
that a widow should have the right to elect either dower or the benefits 
under the Act, whether or not the intestate left issue, but that section 
32 incompletely expresses the intention. The courts might conceivably 
read into section 32 the necessary words, but this could more approp­
riately be done by the legislature. It should be noted that, under the 
section in the Ontario statute2 corresponding to section 32, a widow has 
a choice between dower and the benefits under the Act, whether the 
husband leaves issue or not. It is submitted that the New Brunswick 
Legislature should amend section 32 so as to obtain a similar result.
Lois Holman, I Law, U.N.B.
(2.) R.S.O . 1950, c. 103. s. 8(1).
